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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
This paper explores the relationship between ownership structure and firm value in firms listed on the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange. The results of the estimations, taking into account simultaneity and reverse 
causality, show that the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value differs across firms 
belonging to the sector of innovative technologies and more ‘mature’ firms. The results give support to the 
hypothesis that ‘mature’ firms with higher ownership concentration are likely to perform better than firms 
with more dispersed ownership. On the other hand, in high-tech companies, with large share of knowledge 
related activities, higher ownership concentration is associated with lower firm value. This effect is robust 
to various alternative specifications.  
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1. Introduction. 
 
 
Why do certain firms have large block holders and others do not? Does it matter for corporate 
performance? Since Berle and Means (1932) these questions have been largely explored in corporate 
finance literature. We understand better now the intricacies of the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance. However, empirical evidence on the impact of shareholders with 
significant equity holdings on corporate performance remains ambiguous.  
 
The first wave of empirical papers assumed that ownership is exogenous and explored its impact on firm 
performance (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; 
Holderness et al., 1999). On the other hand, since the initial argument about the endogeneity of ownership 
structure was formulated by Demsetz (1983), an important strand of the literature focused on the 
endogeneity of ownership structure in its relationship with firm performance. Demsetz argued that the 
trading of shares may reflect the desire of existing or potential owners to change their stakes and 
ownership structure is an outcome of shareholders’ decisions. Whether they are willing to hold large or 
small portions of firm equity may depend on specific firm’s characteristics. If firms adapt indeed their 
ownership structure to their environments and specific needs, in equilibrium we should not expect finding 
any significant relationship between ownership and performance. Following this important contribution, 
several papers explored empirically the impact of ownership structure on firm performance taking into 
account endogeneity of ownership. Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Loderer 
and Martin (1997), Cho (1998), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Cowles et al. (2007) use a system of 
simultaneous equations. Another empirical strategy was used by Himmelberg et al. (1999): they argue that 
endogeneity of ownership may be due to individual firm heterogeneity and in order to control for it they 
use firm fixed effects. They find no significant relationship between ownership and performance and 
conclude that shareholders choose ownership structure optimally. Thomsen et al. (2006) use Granger test 
and find that in Continental Europe blockholders’ impact on firm value is negative. Some contrasting 
evidence on the impact of large equity holders on firm performance was found by Lehmann and Weigand 
(2000) and Gugler and Weigand (2003). In the first paper, focusing on German corporations, ownership 
concentration negatively affects firm performance. In the second paper, looking at US and Germany, the 
presence of a large shareholder remains positive and significant for firm performance even after controlling 
for simultaneity.  
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The paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, it looks at ownership concentration and firm 
performance in a transition economy. Exploring this issue, which has been largely studied in developed 
market economies, may be interesting in such an economy because of specific environment in which firms 
operate: in economies, which have recently implemented large scale privatization programs, the relative 
weakness of external mechanisms of control, such as takeovers, labor market, and the legal system, the 
importance of internal mechanisms, and notably ownership concentration, is likely to be stronger (La Porta 
et al., 1999; Johnson et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Denis and McConnell, 2003). The question 
whether concentrated ownership patterns should be imposed in the aftermath of large scale privatization 
programs was often discussed during the working out of privatization strategies in Central and Eastern 
Europe in the 90s. In Poland, which is the focus of this paper, privatization strategy implemented by 
successive governments since 1989 was, implicitly, referring to the agency-cost theory: ownership 
concentration seemed necessary as a monitoring device ensuring the owner full control of managers. In 
more explicit terms, the main concern in choosing specific privatization methods was to create 
‘appropriate’ ownership structure in privatized firms, i.e. to make sure that there are ‘real owners’ holding 
large equity stakes. In the aftermath of privatization, firms could change their ownership structure and the 
existing evidence confirms that the initial, post-privatisation ownership structure was transitory and rapidly 
gave way to new configurations (Grosfeld and Hashi, 2007; Stulz, 2006). Such rapid changes in ownership 
structure, rather unusual for a stable market economy, offer a particularly suitable framework for exploring 
the determinants of ownership concentration and its impact on firm performance. This study considers 
publicly traded firms because of the high quality of available information: reporting and transparency 
requirement on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) are quite strict and comparable to those of Western 
European stock exchanges. 2 Once firms went public it became possible to track these changes and, using 
the information provided by the continuous bidding for firm shares, assess how ownership affects firm 
value.  
 
The second contribution of this study consists in relating the recent perspective on the theory of the firm 
(Holmström and Roberts, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 2000; Zingales, 2002) to the debate about ownership 
concentration and corporate value. Previously, tangible assets were considered as critical resources of the 
firm and legal claims over assets were the most important source of power. Given that in the sector of 
‘new economy’, the role of human capital relative to tangible assets has significantly increased, Rajan and 
Zingales (2000) argue that corporate governance should study mechanisms providing incentives to human 
capital. More specifically, Audretsch and Lehmann (2002) consider that analyzing the relationship 
                                                 
2 The WSE was set up in 1991 with the help of French experts. For the high quality of stock exchange regulations in 
Poland see Glaeser, et al. (2001). In La Porta, et al. (1998), the ranking given to Poland for the protection of investors 
equals the average for 49 countries in the sample. 
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between managers and shareholders requires different perspectives in firms belonging to the sector of 
“new economy” and in firms belonging to more traditional industries. For Carlin and Mayer (2003) 
different ownership structures may be appropriate for different types of activities. They suggest that firms 
in high technology industries may require more dispersed ownership structure while concentrated 
ownership ensuring commitment and long-term investment may be suited to more ‘mature’ industries. 
 
The common idea behind these arguments is that in traditional industries, it is clear what the managers 
need to do and it is therefore important to make sure that they efficiently implement the objectives agreed 
on. In such conditions, the value of monitoring is likely to be high. On the other hand, in firms with strong 
human capital component it is less clear what is the right strategy or the right project. In such highly 
uncertain environment the value of monitoring may be lower: the crucial issue is less to make sure that the 
agent-manager realizes a given objective with a maximum effort than to incite the manager to search for 
the best project. 3  In Aghion and Tirole (1997) concentrated ownership provides incentives to monitor, but 
it also reduces the manager’s initiative or incentive to acquire information. Recognizing the importance of 
managerial initiative is at the heart of the theory of Burkart et al. (1997). They argue that increased 
monitoring by shareholders may be costly if it depresses initiative displayed by managers: managers are 
less likely to be active if they know that shareholders will interfere. So, too much monitoring may hinder 
managerial initiative and profitable investment opportunities would be lost. Burkart et al. (1997) view firm 
ownership structure as an instrument to solve the trade-off between control and initiative. Through more 
dispersed ownership structure shareholders commit themselves to weaker intervention which makes 
managers confident enough that they will not be dispossessed of the benefits of their initiative. 
 
The trade off between initiative and control is likely to be particularly strong in firms belonging to highly 
technological sectors. There are two possible empirical implications of this analysis, depending on 
whether ownership concentration is chosen optimally. 4  If we consider that ownership patterns are 
responsive to the value of monitoring (Holmström and Roberts, 1998; Bolton and von Tadden, 1998) and 
have adjusted to firm specific requirements, ownership concentration should be lower in high-tech firms 
than in more traditional industries and ownership concentration should not be related in a significant way 
to the value of the firm. However, if ownership structure is not in equilibrium and shareholders have not 
                                                 
3 The disincentive effect of monitoring was considered by Demsetz (1983). In Prendergast (2002) monitoring 
activities are more effective in an environment with low risk. He argues that contrary to the standard prediction of 
agency theory, firms delegate decision-making power more in uncertain environments. It happens because a 
principal may have little idea what the right kinds of effort in such cases are and the marginal returns to delegation 
are likely to be higher in more uncertain environments.  
4 Cf. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) for the distinction between equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium analysis of the 
relationship between ownership and performance.  
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optimized their ownership structure, the second implication of this theory would be differential impact of 
concentrated ownership on firm value in the two types of firms. We can expect indeed that increasing their 
equity holdings in ‘old’ industries shareholders contribute to increasing firm value while in high-tech 
firms higher ownership concentration may not improve firm performance. 
 
In order to investigate these issues I use a sample of all non-financial firms listed on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange (WSE) since its creation in 1991 up to 2003. ‘New’ and ‘old’ industries are defined relying on 
the Warsaw Stock Exchange classification of listed equities, which explicitly separates the segment of 
innovative technologies. In the context of a transition economy, undergoing profound ownership, 
institutional and legal transformations, out-of-equilibrium approach appears to be the relevant one.  
 
The results of the estimations of simultaneous equations system show that the ownership – performance 
relation is different in high-tech and ‘mature’ firms. Ownership concentration is positively correlated with 
performance in firms belonging to traditional industries. In high-tech firms the presence of large 
blockholders hurts firm value. Concerning the reverse causality, i.e. the impact of firm value on ownership 
concentration, the results show that in “traditional” industries, shareholders increase their holdings in 
firms with higher Tobin’s Q whereas in high-tech firms this relationship is insignificant. Various 
robustness tests confirm the validity of these findings. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The data are presented in section 2. Section 3 discusses the 
empirical strategy used in this paper in order to identify the impact of ownership concentration on firm 
performance. Results are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Data 
  
The sample includes all non-financial companies traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) between 
1991 and 2003. Banks and other financial companies are not included because they have specific 
problems of valuation and regulation, which would make the comparison difficult. The data was compiled 
from information provided by Notoria, the Polish Security and Exchange Commission and the Business 
Register. The WSE was established in 1991 and for the last fifteen years has been developing rapidly. 
There were 8 listed firms in 1991 and 214 in 2003.  Market capitalisation of the WSE grew steadily 
through the period reaching 21 percent of GDP in 2003. The initial data base was created relying on 
published, audited accounts of balance sheets and income statements. It has been extended manually by 
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including detailed information on ownership structure, firms’ origin, firms’ age, and privatization 
methods.  
 
Two dimensions of ownership structure are taken into account: ownership concentration and type of the 
largest shareholder. The information on ownership structure includes the percentage of cash flow rights 
and voting rights of all shareholders holding more than the mandatory disclosure threshold of 5 percent of 
the shares. This ownership information was collected for all years between 1991 and 2003, with the 
exception of 13 firms which were introduced to the WSE in 1991 and 1992: for these firms the Security 
and Exchange Commission (Komisja Papierow Wartosciowych) did not collect the ownership data in 
1992 and 1993. In some cases smaller shareholdings were also available. Owners are classified by four 
types: family, industrial company, financial institution, and the state. A firm is classified as being 
controlled by a family when there is an individual or a group of individuals (identified by family surname) 
belonging to the same family who control the largest voting block of shares. 
 
The number of firms entering the stock exchange reflected the privatization process and the development 
of the WSE. This sample of listed firms includes firms that were previously state-owned and firms, which 
can be considered as ‘newly created’ in the sense that they never belonged to the state. In 2003 there were 
90 newly created firms and 124 privatized firms. Different privatization methods were used in the case of 
previously state-owned enterprises: 30 firms were privatized through initial public offerings (IPO), 55 
through direct sale, 13 through leveraged employee and managerial buyout, and finally 26 listed 
companies were privatized in the framework of the National Investment Funds programme (a version of 
mass privatization scheme).5  
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for all firms presented in the sample in 2003 and separately for high-
tech firms, i.e. those belonging to the sector of innovative technologies (according to the classification 
used by the WSE) and other firms denoted as ‘mature’. Clearly, the number of high-tech firms is much 
lower than the number of ‘mature’ firms and this limitation should not be forgotten in interpreting the 
results of this paper. Average Tobin’s Q is calculated as the ratio of market value of equity plus book 
value of total debt to book value of total assets. Ownership concentration is measured here (as is common 
in the literature) as the fraction of voting rights of the largest shareholder. Initial profitability is calculated 
as net profit on assets during three years preceding the publication of the prospectus; firms’ size is 
                                                 
5 For details of the National Investment Funds program see Grosfeld and Hashi (2007). 
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measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s sales 6; the number of years of listing represents the time 
since the introduction to the stock exchange; intangibles, including R&D expenditures, patents, brands, 
goodwill and any other nonmonetary assets without physical substance, are defined as the share of 
intangible assets in fixed assets; profitability is defined as the ratio of net profit to sales; firm idiosyncratic 
risk (or firm volatility) is the standard error of the residual of CAPM equation7; and finally, vote/share is a 
proxy for the separation of ownership and control and is defined as the ratio of voting rights to cash flow 
rights of the largest shareholder. 
 
Overall, Table 1 shows that on average high-tech firms are smaller, have larger share of intangible assets 
in fixed assets and have been listed for fewer years than other firms. Table 1 also reveals that firms in the 
sample do not systematically differ in terms of initial or current profitability. The difference in Tobin’s Q 
is significant at five-percent level (it is 1.72 for high-tech firms and 1.24 for ‘mature’ firms). The single 
largest owner controls on average 43 percent of voting shares (median 40 percent). 8 84 percent of the 
companies quoted in 2003 have a single owner holding at least 20 percent of voting shares. 9 Ownership 
concentration is slightly lower in high-tech firms but the difference is insignificant in 2003.  
 
However, considering a specific year, we do not take into account the possibility that firms need time to 
adjust their ownership structure. Table 2 describes how the ownership concentration changes after six 
years of listing. Comparing columns 1 and 2 we see that the fraction of voting rights of the largest 
shareholder in high-tech firms rapidly decreases and reaches 28 percent; in the firms from ‘mature’ 
industries, it remains at 40 percent level. In columns 3 to 6 changes in two other measures of ownership 
concentration are considered:  Shapley value of the largest shareholder and Herfindahl index of the voting 
rights. Shapley value is the probability that the largest shareholder is pivotal in forming a majority 
coalition (>50%).10 Herfindahl index is calculated under the assumption that unknown shareholders hold 
each 4 percent of voting rights: this may underestimate the actual power of the main shareholder. Both 
                                                 
6 As size will be included in the regression for Tobin’s Q, following Loderer and Martin (1997), I use sales rather 
than assets to avoid a spurious correlation with the denominator of Tobin’s Q.  
7 Firm idiosyncratic risk was calculated using data on individual firm daily stock prices. The information was 
collected from the data base provided by the Warsaw Stock Exchange. For each firm and for each year, I ran a 
regression of firm’s daily return on the market return and used the residual standard deviation (and variance) in the 
firm’s return after the effect of its co variation with the market was taken out. Alternatively, the firm’s risk will be 
measured by standard deviation (variance) of returns.  
8 Let us note that median size of largest voting blocks in listed firms in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy and 
Netherlands is about 43 %. See Becht and Röell (1999). For the discussion of ownership structure in the transition 
economies see Berglöf and Pajuste (2003), Klapper et al. (2005), Stulz (2006), Igor Filatotchev et al. (2007) and 
Hanousek et al. (2007). 
9 See, among others, for the use of this threshold La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2002), and Faccio et al. 
(2002).  
10 See Milnor and Shapley (1978), Trojanowski (2008). 
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confirms significant decrease of ownership concentration in high-tech firms and almost stable level of 
ownership measure in ‘mature’ firms.  
 
More detailed ownership structure, taking into account the existence of multiple large owners, is presented 
in Table 3. We distinguish four ownership categories (see, for instance, Laeven and Levine, 2007): firms 
with majority ownership if the largest owner holds at least 50 percent of voting rights; firms with single 
non-majority blockholder if the largest shareholder holds between 20 percent and 50 percent of voting 
rights and no other owner controls more than 20 percent of voting rights; firms with multiple blockholders 
if there is at least a second shareholder with at least 20 percent of voting rights; finally, firms are 
considered as widely held if no shareholder owns more than 20 percent of voting rights. The table shows 
that high-tech firms with multiple blockholders or widely-held have higher value of Tobin’s Q than when 
they are controlled by a majority owner or a single non-majority owner. In the case of mature firms, the 
highest valuation is obtained for majority controlled firms. The results are similar when medians are 
considered instead of averages.  
 
Detailed information on the evolution of ownership concentration by the type of largest owner during the 
first six years of listing is presented in Table 4. We can see that the most important changes took place in 
firms in which the state was the largest shareholder: state’s voting rights declined on average from 84% to 
34% (the decrease of median values is even stronger). In firms in which the largest shareholders were 
families, firms or institutional investors changes in ownership concentration were less spectacular. 11
 
 
3. Empirical strategy 
 
Exploring the links between ownership structure and firm performance, two issues should be taken into 
account: the question of endogeneity of ownership and the question of reverse causality. The problem of 
endogeneity emerges because ownership concentration as an explanatory variable in the equation for firm 
performance is likely to be correlated with the disturbances. Reverse causality means that not only the 
ownership concentration may affect firm performance but also that ownership structure may depend on 
the value of the firm. 12 The impact of performance on owners’ decision to concentrate their holdings is a 
priori ambiguous. If shareholders believe they are able to create value and obtain benefits of control 
                                                 
11  The information provided in table 4 should be taken with caution as the sample changes across years. We do not 
know to what extent changes in ownership concentration are driven by changes in the sample or by changes within 
firms.   
12 Loderer and Martin (1997), Kole (1993) and Cho (1998) provide evidence of reverse causality. 
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sufficiently large to override the cost of the effort and to compensate for the loss of benefits of 
diversification, they may be willing to increase their holdings in firms which have not yet capitalized their 
growth opportunities in the stock price. Such negative relationship was predicted by Kahn and Winton 
(2002). However, especially in the context of an emerging market and weak regulatory environment, 
investors may be reluctant to engage in intensive monitoring and rather reduce their stakes in poorly 
performing companies. In the latter case, we will observe a positive relationship between ownership and 
performance. 13
 
In order to address both problems of endogeneity and reverse causality, I use a simultaneous equations 
framework. In the first equation, the dependent variable is ownership concentration measured as the share 
of the voting rights of the largest shareholder (I also use below another measure of ownership 
concentration, which is defined as the Shapley value of the largest owner); in the second equation the 
dependent variable is firm performance proxied by Tobin’s Q. The obvious difficulty in estimating such 
system of equations is finding appropriate ”order conditions” for identification: each equation must 
exclude at least one exogenous variable which provides a source of variation in the other endogenous 
variable but does not shift the value of the given endogenous variable. It is notoriously difficult to find 
valid instruments for ownership concentration as most of available variables are likely to affect Tobin’s Q. 
The advantage of the present sample is that the firms in the sample have been introduced to the stock 
exchange relatively recently and we can observe that their ownership concentration is strongly negatively 
influenced by the time that has elapsed since the first quotation. This variable is reasonably exogenous: it 
is unlikely that years of listing affect firm value otherwise than through ownership concentration, 
especially if in the equation for Tobin’s Q I control for the age of the firm.14 Therefore, I use the number 
of years a firm has been listed on the stock exchange as the first instrument for ownership concentration. 
Following Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Loderer and Martin (1997), and Brick et al. (2006) who 
instrument ownership concentration by its lagged value, I also use as an additional instrument for 
ownership concentration the share of the voting rights of the largest equity holder before the introduction 
of the firm to the stock exchange. 
 
In order to identify the second equation, for corporate value, I use initial profitability calculated as a ratio 
of net profit to total assets averaged over the three years preceding the publication of the prospectus as 
                                                 
13 Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) find that performance has a significant and negative effect on ownership 
concentration while Jones, et al. (2003) show that lagged profitability does not affect ownership structure in a 
significant way. For some evidence on the relation between ownership concentration and firm performance in Polish 
and Czech mass privatized firms see Grosfeld and Hashi (2007).  
14 Alti (2003) argues that the age of the firm may affect firm investment opportunity set.  
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instrument for Tobin’s Q. Such proxy for performance in the years preceding the listing on the stock 
exchange is likely to be correlated with firm value; however, there is little chance that it affects ownership 
concentration once the firm has been listed on the stock exchange. 
 
So, the identification strategy used in this paper relies upon the hypotheses that Tobin’s Q is not directly 
affected by the number of years of listing (controlling for firms’ age) or by the firm ownership structure 
before its introduction to the stock exchange; and that current ownership concentration is not directly 
affected by firm profitability before the first quotation.  
 
Although the data used in this study has time dimension, I do not use a model with firm level fixed effects. 
Zhou (2001) argued that including fixed effects to investigate the relationship between ownership and 
performance may be misleading because it may fail detecting the effect of ownership on performance even 
if it existed. Using fixed effects, the focus is indeed on within rather than cross-firms variations, which 
appear crucial in investigating whether in some firms higher ownership concentration is more beneficial 
than in others.  
 
The specificity of the sample considered in this study provides an additional argument against using fixed 
effects. In a transition economy like the Polish one in the period under examination, firms are exposed to 
profound industrial, managerial and financial restructurings. This makes questionable the assumption that 
firm specific characteristics do not change over time. In such environment, endogeneity is likely to be 
strongly associated with time-varying characteristics and relying on firm fixed effects, we may fail to 
address this problem effectively. Taking these arguments into account 15 I focus on the endogeneity due to 
the correlation between ownership and idiosyncratic errors in firm value equation. Consequently, the 
following simultaneous equations system is estimated: 
(1) 
Ownership concentration = f (corporate value (t-1), control variables, year fixed effects, Zownconc, e1)  
 
(2) 
Corporate value = g (ownership concentration, control variables, year fixed effects, Zcorpvalue, e2) 
 
 
                                                 
15 An additional argument comes from Pindado and de la Torre (2004) who tried to identify the main source of 
endogeneity of ownership and found that that, in their sample of Spanish firms, it is rather due to the simultaneity 
between ownership and firm value than to unobservable heterogeneity.  
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Ownership concentration is first measured as the logistic transformation of the percentage voting rights 
held by the largest shareholder. Such logistic measure is currently used in the literature (see for instance 
Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, and Himmelberg et al., 1999) in order to make the simple percentage measure 
fit a normal distribution. If the voting rights of the largest shareholder are denoted vote1, logistic measure 
of voting rights is: ln [vote1/(100-vote1)]. Corporate value is defined as the ratio of market value of equity 
plus book value of total debt to book value of total assets (a proxy for Tobin’s Q). As corporate value is 
calculated at the end of the year and ownership data is usually given for the middle of the year, I use 
lagged corporate value in the equation for ownership concentration. The instrument for ownership 
concentration (Zownconc) is 1/ the number of years during which a firm has been listed on the stock 
exchange and 2/ the share of the voting rights of the largest equity holder before the introduction of the 
firm to the stock exchange. Zcorpvalue, the instrument for corporate value, is the initial profitability which 
is calculated as the ratio of net profit to total assets averaged over the three years preceding the publication 
of the prospectus. Year dummies are included to control for common macroeconomic and institutional 
shocks. e1 and e2 are white noise errors. 
 
Control variables in both equations include: size, profitability, three dummy variables equal to one if, 
respectively, the largest share of voting rights is held by a member of a family, an institutional investor or 
the state (industrial company is the reference category); foreign20 is dummy variable equal to one if a 
foreigner holds at least 20 percent of firm voting rights, and zero otherwise16.  In the equation for 
corporate value control variables also include the age of the firm.   
 
Intangibles also appear as a control variable in both equations. It is defined as the share of intangible 
assets in fixed assets. Intangible assets are often included in the equation for Tobin’s Q on the ground that 
firms with more intangible assets are supposed to have higher corporate value. From the viewpoint of this 
paper, it is important to consider intangibles as explanatory variable also in the ownership concentration 
equation. Following Zeckhauser and Pound (1990), we expect that the higher the firm R&D expenditures, 
which are important component of intangibles, the more diffuse is the informational structure and the 
more difficult outside monitoring. Large shareholders are supposed to recognize the problem and, 
therefore ownership concentration is likely to be negatively related to soft capital intensity. 17
 
                                                 
16 It is often argued that foreign investors with their competence and the knowledge of market economy may have, in 
the case of transition economies, positive effect on firm performance.  
17 In this respect this paper departs from Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Helwege et al. (2007). The authors of these 
papers consider that high R&D expenditures create more managerial discretion and information asymmetries and, 
consequently, will be associated with higher ownership concentration.  
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The wedge between the voting rights and the cash flow rights of the largest shareholder (vote/share) is 
another explanatory variable used in both equations. Firms with such explicit separation of ownership and 
control may have important agency problems and may be less valuable than firms in which voting rights 
equal cash flow rights (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Claessens et al. (2002) found in their study of Asian 
firms that although cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder are positively related to firm value, the 
latter decreases when control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash flow rights. Lins (2002) 
found that this effect is significant in countries with low shareholder protection.  
 
The last important control variable included in both equations is firm specific risk (or firm’s volatility), as 
defined in section 2. Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) motivate including risk as a determinant of ownership concentration by the principal agent theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976): when the environment is more volatile, it is more difficult for shareholders 
to monitor managers but there are also more potential benefits from such monitoring. When firm 
environment is relatively stable, the argument goes, shareholders have less difficulty monitoring 
managers. Consequently, it is expected that highly risky firms will have higher ownership concentration. 
To take into account the possibility that the relation between risk and ownership concentration could be 
concave (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Aggarwal and Samwick, 2003), we also include a quadratic term 
(variance) of risk. Both proxies for risk are also included in the equation for corporate value. Stock price 
volatility can be viewed indeed as a measure of uncertainty about future growth prospect of the firm and 
as such it may affect Tobin’s Q.  
  
Before estimating the system of simultaneous equations, I first check the endogeneity of ownership 
concentration and the significance and the validity of instruments for ownership concentration. Then, the 
model of simultaneous equations is estimated using two-stage least squares method (2SLS). I also use 
three-stage least squares methods (3SLS) which might give different results if error terms of individual 
equations in the systems were contemporaneously correlated. But the results turn out to be qualitatively 
similar, which suggests that disturbances are uncorrelated. Consequently, only results from 2SLS model 
are reported. Finally, I also run a series of robustness checks in order to exclude alternative explanations 
of the difference in the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value in high-tech and 
more mature firms. 
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4. Results 
 
The test of endogeneity of ownership concentration does not allow accepting the null hypothesis of no 
correlation between ownership concentration and the error term. Table 5, presents the results of the second 
stage regression of corporate value using ordinary least squares with instrumented ownership 
concentration. In columns 1 and 2 ownership concentration is instrumented by the number of years a firm 
has been listed on the stock exchange. In columns 3 and 4 I use as an additional instrument the 
predetermined ownership structure which is the share of the voting rights of the largest shareholder before 
the introduction of the firm to the stock exchange. In the bottom of Table 5 the results of several tests are 
presented: Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for the endogeneity of ownership concentration, F-test of the joint 
significance of the instruments (F-stat) and Hansen-Sargan test of the validity of the instruments.  
 
The results of Durbin-Wu-Hausman test suggest that ownership structure is endogenous in the sample of 
Polish listed firms and that using simple OLS will produce biased results. F-test for the joint significance 
of the instruments (Stock and Yogo, 2005) does not allow rejecting the hypothesis that the instruments are 
relevant and significant. Finally, when there are more instruments that required for exact identification, the 
over-identifying exclusion restrictions are tested using Hansen-Sargan test (columns 3 and 4 of Table 5. 
The test does not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid (and uncorrelated with the 
regression error term), which gives confidence in the validity of the instruments. 
 
Consequently, the system of simultaneous equations (1) and (2) is estimated using two instruments for 
ownership concentration. Table 6 presents the results of regressions with ownership concentration 
instrumented by the number of years of listing. In Table 7 two instruments are used:  the number of years 
of listing and the initial ownership concentration (before listing). Both Tables present results for all firms 
in the sample and separately for high-tech firms and firms belonging to more ‘mature’ sectors.  
 
The results show that firm value is positively related to ownership concentration. However, this effect is 
driven by the sub-sample of ‘mature’ firms. In the sub-sample of high-tech firms the coefficient of 
ownership concentration is negative. Table 6 also reveals that if all firms are included in the regression, 
past firm value does not affect ownership concentration. However, if high-tech firms and ‘mature’ firms 
are considered separately, the coefficients of lagged Tobin’s Q take opposite signs. In ‘mature’ firms, the 
coefficient is positive and significant which suggests that shareholders increase their equity stakes in 
highly valued firms. On the other hand, in firms belonging to the sector of innovative technologies we 
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observe negative, albeit statistically insignificant correlation between ownership concentration and firm 
value, predicted by Kahn and Winton (2002).  
 
In both specifications, presented in Tables 6 and 7, the instruments for ownership concentration are highly 
significant: the longer a firm is listed on the stock exchange the lower is the share of the voting rights held 
by the largest shareholder. Helwege et al. (2007) also find that in IPO firms in the US ownership 
concentration is negatively related to years since listing. When ownership concentration is additionally 
instrumented by initial ownership concentration, the coefficients of both instrumental variables appear 
highly significant. 
 
The results give support to the idea that ownership concentration varies inversely with intangibles. The 
strongly significant coefficient in ‘mature’ firms becomes, however, insignificant in the sample of high-
tech firms. The reason for it may be that separating high-tech firms captures much of the variation in ‘soft 
capital’: we can see from Table 1 that the share of intangibles in high-tech firms is on average five times 
bigger than in more ‘mature’ firms. 
 
The presence of large foreign owners, holding at least 20 percent of voting rights improves firm 
performance only in the sample of high-tech firms. This result may surprise as it is usually expected that 
the presence of foreign owners should be beneficial for firm performance, especially in the context of a 
transition economy. Hanousek et al. (2007) find indeed that in some cases foreign dominant owners 
positively affect firm performance. However, the results of other empirical works trying to identify such 
effect remain ambiguous. Bae et al. (2005) argue that in more opaque economies local rather than foreign 
investors have bigger information advantage. Klapper et al. (2005), looking for the impact of foreign 
owners on the improvement of corporate governance standards, find that foreign investors do not 
significantly differ from domestic owners.  
 
In order to make sure that the result of the differential relationship between ownership concentration and 
firm value in high-tech and other firms is robust to alternative specifications, I perform the following 
robustness tests.  
 
First, I include privatization methods and firm leverage as additional explanatory variables (Table 8). 
Several authors looking at the determinants of post privatization ownership and performance considered 
the potential impact of privatization process itself (see Boubakri et al., 2005; Bortolotti et al., 2003; 
Hanousek et al., 2007). It is possible that in the sample of Polish listed firms particular privatization 
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method could significantly affect ownership structure of privatized firms, especially during the initial 
years of listing. For instance, firms privatized in the framework of mass privatization scheme had initially 
uniform ownership structure (the largest owner holding 33 percent of shares). In firms privatized through 
IPO the state has initially an important stake. We distinguish four privatization methods: IPO, private sale, 
employee-managerial buy out, and mass privatization scheme and in both equations (1) and (2) we include 
three dummy variables equal to one if, respectively, a firm was privatized by IPO, employee-managerial 
buy-out and mass privatization (private sale is the reference category). The results in columns 1-3 of Table 
8 confirm that when we control for privatization methods the results remain basically unaffected.  
 
Capital structure does not appear in the model considered in this paper. This follows Loderer and Martin 
(1997), who argued that although the role of debt could be non negligible, including it would require 
estimating a much bigger system of equations taking into account a two-way relationship of debt and 
performance, and debt and ownership structure. Such simultaneous estimation of the three endogenous 
variables: ownership concentration, debt and firm value may be considered as a potential extension of this 
paper. At that stage, we simply perform another robustness test and include leverage as explanatory 
variable in both ownership and corporate value equations (columns 4-6 of Table 8). It turns out that the 
impact of debt on Tobin’s Q is significantly greater than zero in ‘mature’ firms (insignificant in high-tech 
firms). The coefficients of ownership concentration are not significantly changed by the inclusion of 
leverage. 
 
The second set of robustness tests uses two different measures of ownership concentration (Table 9). First, 
instead of considering the voting rights of the largest direct shareholder I use the notion of ‘ultimate’ 
owners, introduced by La Porta et al. (1999). If a corporation or financial institution owns a company I 
track its blockholder through the ownership chain and report its voting rights. If the ultimate owner is an 
unlisted firm, I try to identify its owners but it is rarely possible. In such case I follow the convention 
adopted by Faccio and Lang (2002) and classify the unlisted firm as being controlled by a family. The 
results are presented in columns 1-3. In the next three columns of Table 9 ownership concentration is 
measured as the Shapley value of the largest shareholder, i.e. the probability that he is pivotal in forming a 
majority coalition (>50%). In both cases, the results clearly confirm the previously obtained difference in 
the coefficients of ownership concentration in high-tech and ‘mature’ firms.  
 
Finally, I also estimate the simultaneous equations system with an alternative measure of firm risk: instead 
of defining risk as standard error (variance) of the residual of CAPM equation, I take the standard 
deviation (variance) of returns. I run the regressions using two proxies for ownership concentration: the 
 16
logistic transformation of the percentage voting rights of the largest shareholder and the Shapley value of 
the largest owner. The two versions of regressions generate consisting results: the coefficient of ownership 
concentration is greater than zero in ‘mature’ firms and negative in high-tech firms.  
  
The question arises how can be interpreted this differential impact of concentrated ownership on high-tech 
firms and more ‘mature’ firms. Can it be attributed to the trade-off between initiative and control? What 
are possible alternative interpretations? The literature has identified two other costs of concentrated 
ownership: higher potential for expropriation of minority investors (La Porta et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 
2000) and lower stocks’ liquidity, which weakens the informational role of the stock market (Holmström 
and Tirole, 1993; Gaspar and Massa, 2007) and decreases firm value. If expropriation of minority 
investors by controlling shareholders were to be made responsible for our results, it would be difficult to 
explain why this effect is observed only in the sub sample of high-tech firms. But the second possibility 
could be an interesting alternative explanation of the results obtained in this paper. We cannot be sure 
indeed that the negative impact of concentrated ownership on the value of high-tech firms is due to the 
trade-off between initiative and control rather than to the trade-off between liquidity and control. It is 
possible that high uncertainty characterising high-tech firms makes information more valuable and if 
shares are closely held this information is less easily available. Whatever the true channel through which 
corporate ownership affects firm value in ‘new’ and ‘old’ economy, the common denominator of these 
two explanations is high degree of uncertainty: in one case it makes monitoring less valuable, in the other 
it increases the need for information provided by the trading of shares.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 
This paper explores the relationship between ownership structure and firm value in a transition economy 
in order to shed light on the controversial question of the potential advantages of concentrated ownership.  
 
The results of the estimations taking into account simultaneity and reverse causality reveal that the 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm value is different in firms belonging to the sector 
of innovative technologies and in more ‘mature’ firms. For the latter, the results give support to the 
hypothesis that firms with higher ownership concentration is associated with higher firm performance. On 
the other hand, in high-tech companies, with large share of knowledge related activities, higher ownership 
concentration is associated with lower firm value. This effect is robust to various alternative 
specifications.  
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The findings reported here suggest that in order to better understand the relationship between ownership 
and performance we have to take into account important heterogeneity across firms. Answering questions 
such as: “what the characteristics of ‘good’ ownership structure are” or “should the power of large 
shareholders be limited to avoid expropriation or encouraged to curb managerial discretion”, may turn out 
to be more complicated than expected.  
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Table 1. Firm characteristics by type of firms: high-tech versus ‘mature’ firms 
 
Firms are classified into two groups: high-tech, when the firm belongs to the sector of innovative technologies 
according to the classification of listed equities used on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, ‘mature’ otherwise. The table 
presents firm characteristics in 2003 which is the last year covered by the sample. Tobin’s Q is defined as market 
value of equity plus book value of total debt divided by book value of assets. Ownership concentration is the share of 
the voting rights of the largest shareholder. Initial profitability is the average net profit on total assets, calculated for 
the years preceding the publication of the prospectus. Size is the natural logarithm of total sales. Years of listing is 
the number of years since the first listing on the WSE. Intangibles are the share of intangible assets, as they appear 
on the balance sheet, in fixed assets. Profitability is the ratio of net profit to sales. Risk is the standard error of the 
residual of CAPM equation. Vote/share is the ratio of voting rights to cash flow rights of the largest shareholder. 
Medians are in italic and standard errors in parentheses. The last column provides the t-statistics for the differences 
in means between the two categories of firms. Asterisks denote significance of t-tests of equality of means with ***, 
** and * indicating significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.   
 
 
Variable 
 
All firms 
 
High-tech firms 
 
‘Mature’ firms 
 
 
Difference 
Tobin’s Q 
 
1.30 
0.99 
(0.97) 
 
1.72 
1.57 
(0.97) 
1.24 
0.96 
(0.96) 
2.20** 
Ownership 
concentration 
0.43 
0.40 
(0.23) 
 
0.42 
0.35 
(0.27) 
0.44 
0.40 
(0.23) 
-0.35 
Initial 
profitability 
 
0.22 
0.19 
(0.20) 
 
0.27 
0.25 
(0.38) 
0.22 
0.18 
(0.17) 
1.12 
Firm size 11.10 
11.26 
(2.07) 
 
10.64 
10.70 
(2.30) 
11.17 
11.30 
(2.03) 
 
-1.22** 
Years of 
listing 
5.57 
5.00 
(2.66) 
 
3.67 
4.00 
(2.09) 
5.77 
6.00 
(2.64) 
 
-4.00*** 
Intangibles  0.02 
0.003 
(0.04) 
 
0.05 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.01 
0.00 
(0.03) 
4.80*** 
Profitability -0.34 
0.02 
(3.88) 
 
0.09 
0.03 
(0.73) 
 
-0.40 
0.02 
(4.14) 
0.59 
Risk  3.70 
3.35 
(2.06) 
 
3.03 
2.31 
(1.67) 
3.79 
3.41 
(2.09) 
 
-1.60* 
 
Vote/share 
 
1.07 
1.00 
(0.29) 
1.07 
1.00 
(0.13) 
1.06 
1.00 
(0.30) 
-0.10 
Observations 214 28 186  
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Table 2. Concentration of control in high-tech and ‘mature’ firms 
 
The table presents three measures of ownership concentration in the sample of non-financial firms listed 
on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, after one year and after six years of listing: 1/ fraction of voting rights of 
the single largest shareholder; 2/ Shapley value of the largest shareholder (i.e. the probability that he is 
pivotal in forming majority coalition); 3/ Herfindahl index of the voting rights (it is calculated under the 
assumption that unknown shareholders hold each 4% of voting rights; therefore we underestimate the 
actual power of the main shareholder). 
 
 
 
 
Largest shareholder 
 
 
Shapley value 
 
Herfindahl index 
 
Years of listing 
 
 
Years of listing 
 
Years of listing 
 
Sample 
 
1  year 
 
 
6  years 
 
1  year 
 
 
6  years 
 
1  year 
 
 
6  years 
 
All firms 
 
Mean 
Median 
 
 
 
 
0.41  
0.34 
 
 
 
0.39 
0.34 
 
 
 
0.56 
0.42 
 
 
 
0.56 
0.46 
 
 
 
0.27 
0.19 
 
 
 
0.25 
0.20 
 
Mature firms 
 
Mean 
Median 
  
 
 
 
0.41 
0.33 
 
 
 
 
0.40 
0.35 
 
 
 
 
0.56 
0.43 
 
 
 
0.57 
0.47 
 
 
 
 
0.27 
0.19 
 
 
 
0.26 
0.21 
 
High-tech 
firms 
 
Mean 
Median 
 
 
 
 
 
0.42 
0.35 
 
 
 
 
 
0.28 
0.27 
 
 
 
 
 
0.55 
0.35 
 
 
 
 
0.41 
0.33 
 
 
 
 
0.30 
0.24 
 
 
 
 
0.17 
0.11 
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Table 3. Tobin’s Q by ownership category in high-tech and mature firms 
 
Firms have majority ownership if the largest owner holds more than 50 % of voting rights. Firms have 
single non-majority blockholder if the largest shareholder holds between 20 % and 50 % of voting rights 
and there is no other blockholder with at least 20 % of voting rights. Firms have multiple blockholders if 
there is at least a second shareholder with at least 20 % of voting rights. In widely held firms no 
shareholder owns more than 20% of voting rights.  
 
 
  
Number of 
firms 
 
 
Average Q 
 
Median Q 
 
Majority owner 
Of which: mature firms 
high-tech firms  
 
 
450 
419 
31 
 
1.18 
1.15 
1.51 
 
0.98 
0.97 
1.45 
 
Single non-majority owner 
Of which: mature firms 
high-tech firms 
 
450 
420 
30 
 
1.03 
1.00 
1.53 
 
0.87 
0.86 
1.28 
 
 
Multiple blockholders 
Of which: mature firms 
high-tech firms 
 
329 
296 
33 
 
1.13 
1.00 
2.29 
 
0.83 
0.78 
1.95 
 
 
Widely held  
Of which: mature firms 
high-tech firms 
 
 
299 
270 
29 
 
 
1.19 
1.10 
2.01 
 
0.96 
0.95 
2.07 
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Table 4. Ownership concentration by the type of the largest shareholder 
 
The table presents summary statistics on the evolution of ownership concentration (during the first six 
years of listing) measured as fraction of voting rights of the largest shareholder in the sample of non-
financial firms listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange between 1991 and 2003. Owners are classified by 
four types: families, industrial companies, financial institutions, and the state. N represents the number of 
observations.  
 
 
 
Ownership concentration during the first six years of listing 
 
 
Type of the 
largest 
shareholder  
Prospectus 
  
1 year  
  
2 years 
  
3 years 
 
4 years  
  
5 years  
 
 6 years  
 
Family 
Mean 
Median 
N 
 
 
0.517 
0.481 
83 
 
 
 
0.486 
0.450 
85 
 
 
 
0.437 
0.355 
66 
 
 
 
0.399 
0.343 
65 
 
 
 
0.399 
0.332 
64 
 
0.408 
0.358 
60 
 
 
 
0.396 
0.360 
55 
 
 
Financial 
institution 
Mean 
Median 
N 
 
 
 
0.304 
0.330 
63 
 
 
 
 
0.294 
0.325 
61 
 
 
 
 
0.276 
0.300 
67 
 
 
 
 
0.272 
0.294 
53 
 
 
 
 
0.306 
0.283 
44 
 
 
 
 
0.292 
0.254 
37 
 
 
 
 
0.277 
0.249 
31 
 
 
Industrial 
company 
Mean 
Median 
N 
 
 
0.546 
0.525 
64 
 
 
 
0.508 
0.450 
63 
 
 
 
0.462 
0.471 
77 
 
 
 
0.477 
0.461 
77 
 
 
 
0.489 
0.490 
93 
 
 
 
0.520 
0.500 
92 
 
 
 
0.486 
0.450 
83 
 
 
State 
Mean 
Median 
N 
 
 
0.837 
0.999 
46 
 
0.796 
0.999 
44 
 
 
 
0.515 
0.511 
22 
 
 
 
0.417 
0.355 
24 
 
 
 
0.423 
0.365 
19 
 
 
 
0.349 
0.295 
17 
 
 
 
0.338 
0.285 
14 
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Table 5. Tests for endogeneity of ownership concentration, validity and 
significance of the instruments 
The table presents results of the estimation of IV regression where the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. In columns 
(1) and (2) ownership concentration is instrumented by the number of years a firm has been listed on the stock 
exchange. In columns (3) and (4) initial ownership concentration (before the first listing) is used as additional 
instrument for ownership concentration. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus book value of total debt 
divided by book value of assets. Ownership concentration is the logistic transformation of the percentage voting 
rights of the largest shareholder. Initial profitability is the average net profit on total assets, calculated for the years 
preceding the publication of the prospectus. Size is the natural logarithm of total sales. Years of listing are defined as 
the number of years of listing on the WSE. Intangibles are the share of intangible assets in fixed assets. Profitability 
is the ratio of net profit to sales. Owners are classified by four types: family, financial institution, and the state 
(industrial company is the reference category). Vote/share is the ratio of voting rights to cash flow rights of the 
largest shareholder. Risk and risk² are respectively the standard error and variance of the residual of CAPM equation. 
All regressions include intercepts and year fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted ***, **, and *, respectively. Three tests are reported at the 
bottom of the table: Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests for endogeneity of ownership concentration; F-stat for the relevance 
of the instruments (joint significance of the instruments); Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions (validity 
of the instruments).  
 
IV: years of listing 
 
 
IV: years of listing, initial 
ownership concentration 
 
 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ownership concentration 0.111** 0.176*** 0.111*** 0.143*** 
 (0.049) (0.057) (0.033) (0.040) 
Age -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size -0.018 -0.001 -0.016 -0.003 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020) 
Intangibles 2.086*** 2.456*** 2.104*** 2.327*** 
 (0.709) (0.747) (0.705) (0.728) 
Profitability -0.013 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Family 0.270*** 0.243*** 0.239*** 0.210*** 
 (0.059) (0.063) (0.060) (0.062) 
Financial institution 0.092 0.162** 0.081 0.123* 
 (0.071) (0.078) (0.066) (0.071) 
State -0.016 -0.138 -0.030 -0.106 
 (0.100) (0.122) (0.090) (0.105) 
Foreign owner>20% 0.100 0.030 0.110* 0.060 
 (0.066) (0.074) (0.065) (0.070) 
Vote/share 0.010 -0.015 0.012 -0.009 
 (0.061) (0.063) (0.060) (0.060) 
Risk  -0.073**  -0.092*** 
  (0.032)  (0.031) 
Risk²  0.010***  0.013*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Initial profitability 1.137*** 1.112*** 1.148*** 1.116*** 
 (0.122) (0.127) (0.121) (0.124) 
Observations 1264 1163 1217 1116 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, p-value 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 
F-stat 1st stage, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hansen-Sargan test (p-value)   0.802 0.504 
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Table 6. Ownership concentration and Tobin’s Q:  system of simultaneous 
equations (1) 
 
The table presents results of the estimation of simultaneous equations system with ownership concentration 
instrumented by the number of years a firm has been listed on the stock exchange. All variables are defined as in 
Table 5. All regressions include intercepts and year fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted ***, **, and *, respectively.  
 
 
 
Variables 
 
All firms 
  
(1) 
 
All firms 
 
(2) 
 
‘Mature’ 
firms 
(3) 
 
‘Mature’ 
 firms 
(4) 
 
High-tech 
firms  
(5) 
 
High-tech 
firms  
(6) 
 
Dep. variable: Tobin’s Q  
 
Ownership 
concentration 
Tobin’s Q  
 
  Ownership 
concentration 
Tobin’s Q  
 
Ownership 
concentration  
 
Tobin’s Q (t-1)  0.036  0.133**  -0.202 
  (0.054)  (0.061)  (0.125) 
Ownership 
concentration 
 
0.341*** 
  
0.403*** 
  
-0.859** 
 
 (0.085)  (0.083)  (0.417)  
Age -0.003***  -0.002**  -0.034  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.034)  
Size -0.021 0.143*** -0.023 0.153*** -0.341** -0.105 
 (0.025) (0.033) (0.026) (0.036) (0.137) (0.087) 
Intangibles 3.129*** -4.097*** 2.143** -3.928*** 1.904 -0.028 
 (0.876) (1.226) (1.024) (1.482) (2.529) (1.869) 
Profitability -0.030** -0.008 -0.030** -0.011 -0.054 0.082 
 (0.014) (0.022) (0.014) (0.022) (0.162) (0.126) 
Family 0.301*** -0.512*** 0.281*** -0.535*** 0.055 0.362 
 (0.076) (0.101) (0.080) (0.108) (0.432) (0.273) 
Financial institution 0.305*** -0.918*** 0.363*** -0.949*** -0.146 -0.046 
 (0.101) (0.104) (0.103) (0.107) (0.563) (0.436) 
State 0.172 -0.576*** 0.152 -0.595*** -0.945 -0.834 
 (0.115) (0.159) (0.116) (0.163) (1.209) (0.916) 
Foreign owner>20% -0.137 0.763*** -0.179** 0.735*** 1.391** 0.983** 
 (0.092) (0.105) (0.091) (0.109) (0.663) (0.444) 
Vote/share -0.148* 0.470*** -0.123 0.377*** 2.350** 1.894*** 
 (0.080) (0.100) (0.082) (0.111) (0.933) (0.315) 
Risk -0.130*** 0.224*** -0.147*** 0.235*** -0.752* 0.028 
 (0.039) (0.050) (0.041) (0.052) (0.405) (0.314) 
Risk² 0.012*** -0.008*** 0.013*** -0.008*** 0.046 -0.020 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.039) (0.029) 
Initial profitability 1.022***  1.007***  0.754*  
 (0.148)  (0.180)  (0.426)  
Years of listing  -0.177***  -0.178***  -0.139** 
  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.068) 
Observations 984 913 71 
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Table 7. Ownership concentration and Tobin’s Q: system of simultaneous 
equations (2) 
 
The table presents results of estimation of simultaneous equations system with ownership concentration instrumented 
by the number of years a firm has been listed on the stock exchange and by the ownership concentration before the 
first listing. All variables are defined as in Table 5. All regressions include intercepts and year fixed effects (not 
reported). Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted ***, 
**, and *, respectively.  
 
 
Variables 
 
All firms 
  
(1) 
 
All firms 
 
(2) 
 
‘Mature’ 
firms 
(3) 
 
‘Mature’ 
 firms 
(4) 
 
High-tech 
firms  
(5) 
 
High-tech 
firms  
(6) 
 
Dep. variable Tobin’s Q  
 
Ownership 
concentration 
Tobin’s Q  
 
  Ownership 
concentration 
Tobin’s Q  
 
Ownership 
concentration  
 
Tobin’s Q (t-1)  0.014  0.105*  -0.007 
  (0.054)  (0.062)  (0.111) 
Ownership 
concentration 0.264***  0.342***  -0.696**  
 (0.071)  (0.072)  (0.265)  
Age -0.003***  -0.002**  -0.042  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.031)  
Size -0.013 0.111*** -0.014 0.120*** -0.309** 0.004 
 (0.024) (0.034) (0.025) (0.037) (0.120) (0.074) 
Intangibles 2.841*** -3.923*** 1.919* -3.694** 1.728 0.639 
 (0.836) (1.225) (0.981) (1.487) (2.481) (1.524) 
Profitability -0.029** -0.004 -0.030** -0.006 -0.060 0.123 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.014) (0.022) (0.159) (0.103) 
Family 0.257*** -0.485*** 0.232*** -0.503*** -0.020 0.214 
 (0.072) (0.102) (0.076) (0.110) (0.399) (0.224) 
Financial institution 0.228** -0.970*** 0.299*** -1.003*** -0.136 -0.130 
 (0.094) (0.106) (0.097) (0.109) (0.554) (0.355) 
State 0.127 -0.862*** 0.115 -0.838*** -0.788 -0.622 
 (0.110) (0.169) (0.111) (0.174) (1.149) (0.748) 
Foreign owner>20% -0.085 0.724*** -0.146* 0.717*** 1.225** 0.114 
 (0.088) (0.110) (0.088) (0.114) (0.569) (0.407) 
Vote/share -0.110 0.398*** -0.093 0.306*** 2.020*** 0.441 
 (0.073) (0.100) (0.077) (0.112) (0.648) (0.384) 
Risk -0.129*** 0.244*** -0.149*** 0.250*** -0.755* 0.015 
 (0.038) (0.052) (0.039) (0.054) (0.412) (0.263) 
Risk² 0.013*** -0.009*** 0.014*** -0.008** 0.049 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.039) (0.025) 
Initial profitability 1.011***  1.009***  0.759*  
 (0.142)  (0.174)  (0.419)  
Years of listing  -0.197***  -0.199***  -0.183*** 
  (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.057) 
Initial ownership 
concentration  0.053***  0.044***  0.568*** 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.117) 
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Table 8. Robustness tests: privatization methods and leverage 
 
The table presents results of the estimation of Tobin’s Q as part of simultaneous equations system (as in Table 7). 
The following additional control variables are included: in columns (1) – (3) privatization methods are represented 
by three dummy variables equal to one if, respectively, a firm was privatized by IPO, employee-managerial buy-out 
(embo) and mass privatization (mpp), private sale being the reference category; in columns (4) - (6) leverage is 
defined as the share of total debt in total assets. All regressions include intercepts and year fixed effects (not 
reported). Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted ***, 
**, and *, respectively. 
 
Variables All firms 
 
(1) 
‘Mature’ 
firms 
(2) 
High-tech 
firms 
(3) 
All firms 
 
(4) 
‘Mature’ 
firms 
(5) 
High-tech 
firms 
(6) 
Ownership 
concentration 0.099** 0.156*** -0.669** 0.298*** 0.329*** -0.693** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.258) (0.064) (0.060) (0.292) 
Age -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.043 -0.002** -0.001 -0.042 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.032) (0.001) (0.001) (0.032) 
Size 0.001 0.002 -0.311** -0.051** -0.046** -0.311** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.124) (0.021) (0.021) (0.129) 
Intangibles 2.155*** 1.176 1.831 2.805*** 1.293 1.693 
 (0.761) (0.859) (2.563) (0.751) (0.833) (2.511) 
Profitability -0.029** -0.029** -0.055 0.012 0.012 -0.069 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.164) (0.013) (0.012) (0.183) 
Family 0.199*** 0.165** -0.038 0.227*** 0.202*** -0.023 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.409) (0.065) (0.064) (0.405) 
Financial institution 0.105 0.147* -0.147 0.232*** 0.255*** -0.150 
 (0.077) (0.075) (0.570) (0.085) (0.082) (0.576) 
State 0.023 -0.016 -0.839 0.178* 0.147 -0.785 
 (0.107) (0.102) (1.188) (0.099) (0.094) (1.167) 
Foreign owner>20% 0.032 -0.025 1.162* -0.079 -0.104 1.212** 
 (0.075) (0.073) (0.585) (0.079) (0.075) (0.575) 
Vote/share -0.039 -0.021 1.905*** -0.177*** -0.126* 2.034** 
 (0.064) (0.065) (0.666) (0.066) (0.065) (0.781) 
Risk -0.080** -0.089*** -0.781* -0.174*** -0.176*** -0.770* 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.425) (0.035) (0.034) (0.436) 
Risk² 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.055 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.052 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.041) (0.002) (0.002) (0.043) 
Initial profitability 0.893*** 0.853*** 0.761* 1.273*** 1.340*** 0.762* 
 (0.130) (0.154) (0.431) (0.130) (0.150) (0.424) 
Mpp -0.168** -0.152* 0.000    
 (0.084) (0.080) (0.000)    
embo -0.059 -0.011 -0.271    
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.581)    
IPO 0.064 0.108 0.000    
 (0.082) (0.079) (0.000)    
Leverage    0.891*** 0.913*** -0.049 
    (0.055) (0.053) (0.501) 
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Table 9. Robustness tests: alternative measures of ownership concentration 
 
The table presents results of the estimation of Tobin’s Q as part of simultaneous equations system (as in Table 
7).Two alternative measures of ownership concentration are used: in columns (1) - (3) the voting power of the 
ultimate owner is considered; in columns (4) – (6) the Shapley value of the largest owner is defined as the probability 
that he is pivotal in forming a majority coalition (>50%). All regressions include intercepts and year fixed effects 
(not reported). Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted 
***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Variables All firms 
 
(1) 
‘Mature’ 
firms 
(2) 
High-tech 
firms 
(3) 
All firms 
 
(4) 
‘Mature’ 
firms 
(5) 
High-tech 
firms 
(6) 
 
Ultimate owner 0.202*** 0.265*** -0.813**    
 (0.066) (0.065) (0.322)    
Shapley value    0.850*** 1.122*** -1.992** 
    (0.244) (0.249) (0.790) 
Age -0.003*** -0.002** -0.055* -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.025 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.032) (0.001) (0.001) (0.035) 
Size -0.015 -0.018 -0.294** -0.003 -0.004 -0.322** 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.127) (0.022) (0.023) (0.123) 
Intangibles 2.911*** 2.253** 1.657 2.444*** 1.551* 2.026 
 (0.846) (0.998) (2.670) (0.791) (0.922) (2.491) 
Profitability -0.029** -0.029** -0.026 -0.023* -0.021 -0.051 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.174) (0.014) (0.013) (0.159) 
Family 0.168** 0.110 0.142 0.271*** 0.253*** -0.143 
 (0.066) (0.069) (0.454) (0.073) (0.076) (0.385) 
Financial institution 0.096 0.126 -0.040 0.235** 0.316*** -0.220 
 (0.076) (0.077) (0.599) (0.097) (0.100) (0.552) 
State 0.051 0.021 -0.780 0.125 0.119 -0.771 
 (0.104) (0.104) (1.236) (0.108) (0.107) (1.144) 
Foreign owner>20% -0.073 -0.139 1.283** -0.009 -0.046 1.502** 
 (0.092) (0.092) (0.621) (0.077) (0.075) (0.634) 
Vote/share -0.083 -0.071 2.223*** -0.099 -0.083 1.904*** 
 (0.071) (0.075) (0.749) (0.071) (0.073) (0.628) 
Risk -0.111*** -0.124*** -0.593 -0.093*** -0.103*** -0.664 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.456) (0.034) (0.034) (0.416) 
Risk² 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.034 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.036 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.044) (0.002) (0.002) (0.040) 
Initial profitability 0.959*** 0.927*** 0.897* 0.977*** 0.969*** 0.596 
 (0.138) 
 
(0.167) 
 
(0.453) 
 
(0.137) 
 
(0.164) 
 
(0.423) 
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